How did the North prevent the Diplomatic Recognition of the South during the Civil War

Charge of the Iron Brigade near the Dunker Church during the Battle of Antietam, 1862

One of the most important victories won by the United States during the Civil War was not ever fought on a battlefield. Rather, it was a series of diplomatic victories that ensured that the Confederacy would fail to achieve diplomatic recognition by even a single foreign government. Although this success can be attributed to the skill of Northern diplomats, the anti-slavery sentiments of the European populace, and European diversion to crises in Poland and Denmark, the most important factor stills rise from the battlefields on American soil. The Confederate states were incapable of winning enough consecutive victories to convince European governments that they could sustain independence.

The South believed it would be recognized by Europe

Southerners began the war effort confident that the cotton their plantations provided European textile manufacturers would naturally ally their governments to the Confederacy, especially Great Britain. After declaring secession, the North would declare a blockade on Southern ports. Any interruption of cotton supply would disrupt the British economy and reduce the workers to starvation, they thought. Britain would have to break the blockade and provoke a war with the North that would allow Confederates to solidify independence and gain international recognition.

James Hammond of South Carolina in 1858 said, "What would happen if no cotton was furnished for 3 years. England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, save the South." The South doubled down on this bet and threatened embargo cotton. They assumed that Britain and France would be forced to recognize the South to save their economies. Even though the embargo never became the official policy of the Confederacy, planters did it on their own.[1]

When the Union did declare a blockade upon the rebel states in April 1861, however, it did not prompt the response expected from the Europeans. The blockade’s legal and political implications took on greater significance than its economic effects because it undermined Lincoln’s insistence that the war was merely an internal insurrection. A blockade was a weapon of war between sovereign states. In May, Britain responded to the blockade with a proclamation of neutrality, which the other European powers followed. This tacitly granted the Confederacy belligerent status, the right to contract loans and purchase supplies in neutral nations and to exercise belligerent rights on the high seas. The Union was greatly angered by European recognition of Southern belligerency, fearing that is was the first step toward diplomatic recognition, but as British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell said, “The question of belligerent rights is one, not of principle, but of fact.”

The United States warned Europe to avoid fraternizing with the South

Sensitive to any further international recognition of the Confederates as statesmen rather than rebels, Secretary of State William H. Seward instructed Charles Francis Adams, Minister to England and the son of former Secretary of State and President John Quincy Adams, to warn the British not to “fraternize with our domestic enemy,” whether officially or unofficially, or risk an Anglo-American war. But the Union realized that Europe’s declarations of neutrality also constituted official acceptance of the blockade, a position with many long-standing implications.

Although international law stated that a blockade must be “physically effective” to be legally binding on neutral powers, the definition was ambiguous. From before the War of 1812, the United States had insisted upon a strict definition in order to maintain trading rights as a neutral. Now, however, the United States was the belligerent and Britain the predominant neutral power. By officially respecting the Union blockade, even if it was not fully “physically effective,” Britain maintained a consistent position on belligerent rights. The U.S. reversal of its traditional position stressing neutral rights set the precedent that it would be obligated to respect the British argument in future naval issues.

In 1861, the U.S.S. San Jacinto seized two Confederate representatives who were aboard British steamer, Trent, after they had sailed from Havana. This quickly morphed into a diplomatic crisis between the US and Britain. Cooler heads prevailed and Lincoln ordered that the two representatives be allowed to proceed to Britain. The British agreed to this course and deescalated the crisis. Fortunately for the United States, the seizure of the Conferedate emissaries delayed the Confederacy's discussions with Britain. During the delay, the war turned in favor of the North as it won victories in on both the Atlantic and in the West. This further delayed Britain from making any decisions.[2]

Military in 1862 gains by the Confederacy spurred discussions of recognizing the Confederacy

Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister of Great Britain (1859-1865)

In 1862, the Confederacy made several important military gains that made it more likely that they could gain recognition from Britain and Louis Napoleon's French government. These victories were accompanied by a charm offensive by the Alabamian Henry Hozte. Hotze moved easily with the British upper class and was an effective advocate for the Confederacy. The US blockade of the South finally caused a cotton shortage with British textile mills and hurt industrial areas in the country. Both popular and political opinion of the Civil War was split in the country. B

Despite these gains, Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister (1859-1865), would only recognize Southern independence if they won the war. He had little interest in undermining Britain's fragile relationship with the United States to prop up the Confederacy. Louis Napoleon was not nearly as careful as Palmerston because he wanted to expand France's empire into Mexico. The Confederacy supported Napoleon's but they wanted diplomatic recognition and naval support from France. Europe's other powers, Austria and Russia, were split on who to support and this prevent ed Europe from proposing a summit or armistice to end the war.[3]

Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation altered the diplomatic equation

The bloody victory of the Union forces at Antietam gave Lincoln an opening to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. The victory at Antietam demonstrated that the South was not on the precipice of victory. It became clear that the war would continue that the Union and Lincoln had little interest in anything except a Confederate surrender. The Emancipation Proclamation not only freed the slaves in Confederate territory, but it also authorized the enlistment of black soldiers and made the civil war. Finally, it subtly transformed the Civil War from a war about union to conflict about freedom and slavery. Any momentum the South had made was undermined by Antietam and Lincoln's Proclamation.


While the Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation did not end the Confederacy's effort to receive diplomatic recognition from the European powers, it severely undermined it. The Emancipation Proclamation undermined support for the South throughout Europe because of the continued ownership of slaves. By 1864, the Confederacy was so desperate to win diplomatic recognition that Jefferson Davis authorized a Southern delegation led Duncan F. Kenner to offer emancipation in exchange for diplomatic recognition, but ultimately the South's failure to win on the battlefield doomed their efforts.[4]


  1. James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1988), p.383
  2. McPherson, Battle Hymn of the Republic, p. 389-91.
  3. McPherson, The Battle Hymn of the Republic, p. 553-556.
  4. McPherson, Battle Hymn of the Republic, p.837-38