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In February 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency published an interagency memo that evaluated the worldwide response to the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan. It is a fascinating product of its time because it shows how the Cold War alliances impacted several of the nation-states' response to Soviet aggression. Additionally, the CIA sought to determine which states now viewed the Soviets more negatively than before. It also provides a fairly comprehensive overview of how the world perceived and reacted to the Soviet Invasion. Some portions of the memo were redacted, but most of the memo was preserved. In a few portions of the memo, we have included the word "REDACTED" where meaningful portions of the text were missing.
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International public reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been overwhelmingly negative, although in varying shades of intensity
In the case of several states, the negative private reaction among government leaders has been masked by silence or in some cases lukewarm public support for the invasion. Some public backing for Moscow, particularly by radical Arab states, has hidden private apprehensions over future Soviet goals.
Some of the smaller African nations appear to have abstained from the vote to avoid endangering their access to aid from either the West or the Communist bloc. Yet, some who have sought Soviet aid, such as Jamaica voted in favor of the UN resolution, possibly at some cost to themselves.
Moderate Arab states have generally condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Of the radical Arabs, only Iraq has criticized the Soviets. The other radical states and the Palestinians have offered varying degrees of public support to Moscow, although some are privately critical and 26X4 apprehensive about Soviet goals in the region.
Some of the Arabs have defended their mild responses to the Soviet invasion as being in line with their policies concerning the occupation of Arab land by a US proxy—Israel. The Arabs clearly believe that the unresolved Palestinian question, not Soviet expansionism, is the most serious threat to political stability in the Middle East.
The Israelis predictably interpret recent events in Iran and Afghanistan as support for their longstanding contention that the central destabilizing factor in the region is not the Arab-Israeli conflict but a combination of Soviet expansionism, growing domestic instability in the Muslim states, and the Islamic revival. Given its perception of rapidly worsening regional instability, the Begin government will be even less willing to consider major concessions on Palestinian autonomy. Instead, Begin will increasingly emphasize the critical “larger” need for cooperation on regional security among the United States, Egypt, and Israel.
Iran has officially condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and many Iranian officials, both secular and clerical, have strongly criticized the Soviets. The Soviet Embassy in Tehran has been attacked twice by Afghan and Iranian crowds. Already strained relations between Tehran and Kabul have deteriorated further. By recent Iranian standards, however, the reaction has been restrained. Ayatollah Khomeini has not publicly commented directly on the Soviet move, and Iran has taken a low profile in the UN. In part this has reflected Iran's preoccupation with the hostage crisis and its need for Soviet support in the UN Security Council. In addition, the Iranians are well aware of Soviet military power and do not want to provoke their northern neighbor.
Among the South Asian countries, India's reaction to the events in Afghanistan has been the mildest. The responses of the other four countries have been far more negative, and all have been tempered by regional and domestic considerations. Only one state, Pakistan, is directly affected by the Soviet invasion, but it tends to view the situation as both an opportunity and a long-term threat.
Nepal supported the UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, but probably will not take an active role in any efforts to implement it. Ultimately, Nepal's reaction will be largely dictated by its geographical location between two giants, India and China, who have adopted significantly different responses to the crisis. Sri Lanka also supported the UN resolution but subsequently has adopted a quieter "wait-and-see" attitude. '''REDACTED'''
Beijing's public reaction to the Soviet invasion has combined a drumbeat of criticism with calls for an unspecified action by anti-hegemonists to thwart the Soviet move. '''REDACTED'''
New Zealand is reviewing its relations with Moscow. On 22 January Wellington cut the Soviet fishing quota in New Zealand waters for the license year beginning 1 April. Official visits to the USSR have been canceled and trade talks left in abeyance. A Soviet correspondent also has been expelled. New Zealand stopped short, however, of cutting its agricultural exports to the Soviet Union on the grounds that an embargo would further damage the depressed New Zealand economy and would hurt New Zealand more than the Soviet Union.
Twenty-three of the 104 UN members that voted in favor the of UN General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan were Sub-Saharan African states. These countries are either pro-Western or genuinely nonaligned. Some of them, mainly small, weak states that may have felt protected by the UN umbrella—took the opportunity to make additional public statements condemning superpower interference in the Third World. Liberian President Tolbert, in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of African Unity, appealed to Fidel Castro, chairman of the nonaligned movement, to condemn Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The three African countries that voted against the resolution- Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique— all have close ties with and are to some degree dependent upon the USSR. They could be expected to support the Soviets on almost any issue.
Of the remaining 17 states, 11 abstained and six were absent or did not vote-all for a variety of reasons. Some of the abstainers were left-leaning states and some were special cases. Most probably abstained in order to avoid jeopardizing their access to aid from either the West or the Communists. For example, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, which recently installed new pro-Western regimes, abstained either because of disorganization or a desire to keep their options open. Zambia's abstention and lack of any official statement probably represents represent an attempt to protect its bilateral ties with the USSR. But it did vote with the United States on the motion referring the Soviet-Afghan issue to the General Assembly, its Foreign Minister has privately reprimanded the Soviet Ambassador, and its government-influenced press later denounced the Soviet intervention.
The six nonvoting states included some, like South Africa, which seldom participate participates in UN votes. The Central African Republic probably believed it could not vote on this issue in view of the recent French operations in its territory. The new government of Chad is strongly opposed to foreign intervention but probably believed its own situation was too fragile for it to criticize anyone.
Latin American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been almost universally critical. The Caribbean and Central American countries—with the exceptions of Cuba and, surprisingly, Grenada--voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Nicaragua abstained, and only Dominica, whose pro-US government has no representative accredited to the UN, failed to vote. On balance, the voting confirmed other evidence that the Soviet action has boosted the US position and has seriously hurt the USSR in the region.
The Soviet invasion has posed a dilemma for the Cuban Government. Castro, as nominal leader of the nonaligned movement, undoubtedly felt some obligation to take a stand against the Soviet action, but Cuba's overwhelming dependence on the USSR brought strong pressure from Moscow. Cuba's difficulty was reflected in Havana's reluctance to offer immediate, unequivocal support for the Soviet position. The vital nature of Cuba's economic and military links, however, decisively determined Havana's position. The Cuban media eventually came out on the side of the Soviets, and Cuba voted against the UN resolution condemning the intervention. A lengthy Soviet military action could undermine Cuba's efforts to woo wealthy Arab states as well as Castro's pretensions to world leadership via the nonaligned movement. The Soviet action may place some temporary strains on Cuba's relationship with Moscow, but it is unlikely by itself to produce serious tensions.
The West European countries predictably have condemned the Soviet invasion, and the European press, for the most part, has been more critical of the Soviets than individual governments. Many articles compare the situation to the 1930s and chide Europeans for not responding to Soviet aggression in practical ways. While individual governments are united on broad policy concepts, they are divided on what specific actions to take against the Soviets. Most countries welcome the stronger US reaction to the Afghanistan situation, but their own concrete steps in curtailing relations with the Soviet Union will be carefully measured to each country's individual requirements and will be cloaked as much as possible by the UN and other international means.
Communist Party not unexpectedly stands out as the most supportive of the Soviet action, as reflected in the recent conversations—highly publicized by the Soviets—between party bosses Marchais and Brezhnev in Moscow. The smaller Portuguese Communist Party, in keeping with its strong pro-Moscow bent, also has completely backed the Soviet invasion.
The Warsaw Pact countries varied in their press coverage of the Afghan crisis during the first days of the invasion. Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German commentary was the firmest in support of the invasion, while Hungary and Poland remained relatively restrained. Subsequently, with the exception of Romania, media coverage has assumed a uniformly militant tone, defending the Soviet action and condemning alleged support of the Afghan rebels by "external forces," usually identified as the United States and China. Underneath the predictable public attitudes, however, private feelings are varied. It appears that all of the East European regimes are deeply disturbed by the implications of the Soviet move and concerned that any long-term setback in East-West relations may worsen their economic difficulties and reduce their political latitude.
Hungary, where the popular reaction is reported to be overwhelmingly negative, has expressed the hope that bilateral relations with the United States will be as little affected as possible. Bulgarian officials have stated privately that they hope bilateral relations can be kept separate from propaganda matters and will continue to improve. The Czechoslovak press has adhered to its customary pro-Soviet, anti-US line; perhaps out of concern for popular reaction, however, official commentary has been sparse.
Although East Germany's public support for the USSR remains unquali fied, the leadership apparently was surprised by the vehemence of the Western reaction. Recent speeches and press reporting have played down the Afghan situation and devoted more space to the need for detente, arms control negotiations, and business as usual. The Poles probably fear that the cooling of US-Soviet relations will affect US-Polish relations or, even more importantly, overall East-West relations. More than any other East European country, Poland has benefited from detente and needs economic assistance from the West. According to US diplomats in Warsaw, Polish officials are embarrassed at defending the Soviets and have expressed pessimism about the future course of US-Polish relations despite American assurances that the United States will seek to pursue a “differentiated" policy toward Eastern Europe.
Romania, predictably, has parted company with its East European allies; it has refrained from recognizing the new Afghan Government, and President Ceausescu has implicitly condemned the Soviet invasion. Privately, Roma nian officials have made clear their alarm over the implications of the Soviet act and have solicited US support. At the same time, however, they have avoided direct public criticism of Moscow and have linked the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan with the cessation of external assistance to Afghan rebels. In a recent speech, Ceausescu pessimistically described the current international situation as the most tense tensest since World War II, warned that “wide-scale military confrontation" threatened, and exhorted his countrymen to be prepared to defend Romania. Ceausescu also appears fearful that a chill in East-West relations will sharply reduce Romania's latitude to pursue its autonomous foreign policy and apprehensive that the Soviets may be inclined to meddle in neighboring Yugoslavia after President Tito dies.
The Yugoslav Government has officially condemned the Soviet intervention and expressed “astonishment” and “deep concern” about developments in Afghanistan. Yugoslav media have challenged the Soviet assertion that the USSR moved at the invitation of authorities in Kabul, and the press reported with unprecedented speed the fact that President Carter sent a letter to Tito. The Soviet intervention has heightened Yugoslav anxiety about Soviet intentions in the post-Tito period. One senior Yugoslav official reportedly told a group of associates that he views the Soviet action in Afghanistan as a "blueprint" of what could happen in Yugoslavia after Tito dies.
