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[[File:101 inspection.jpg|thumbnail|left|250px|Police Battalion 101 being inspected, circa 1941.]]
In the preface to his book, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0062303023/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0062303023&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=4b4bce855a1498173d8214535c46adca Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland]'', Christopher R. Browning makes it abundantly clear that “Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving.”<ref>Christopher R. Browning, ''Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland'' (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), xx.</ref> Throughout this aptly titled book, this account of Germany’s Reserve Police Battalion 101 supports Browning’s position that these predominantly working-class men from Hamburg were transformed into killers; most reluctantly, yet some eager. No single event changed them, the transformation was multi-causal in nature. As is true with all individuals, one responds to crisis according to his abilities. The men of the 101st were no different. Some became avid———even sadistic———in their killing while most became obedient killers. The ten to twenty percent of the group who did not kill became courageous. Regardless of the results of the changes in the men, each individual had to ''become'' something foreign to his fundamental nature. Browning supports this thesis throughout his work and is convincing in his opinion that the ordinary men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 became killers as a result of deflection, the weight of conformity and obedience, and most significantly through desensitization.
==== Life Before the 101 ====
Heinz Buchmann,* the proprietor of a lumber business in Hamburg, was drafted into the order police in 1939. <ref> Browning, 56.Browning changed the names of some of the reservists and denoted such changes by an asterisk. This format will be maintained in this essay.</ref>He did not volunteer for service in the battalion nor did he have aspirations to become an officer. He was selected for officer training as he was well educated and considered middle-class, as opposed to the 63 percent of the battalion who were deemed working-class.<ref>Browning, 47.</ref> This middle-aged group of civilians had jobs, homes, families, and friends. Their societal participation was conducted in relative anonymity as they undertook no exceptional acts; they were average men. Though he was ranked in the middle-class, Buchmann was no different. Browning clearly notes that Buchmann was described as a “‘typical civilian’ who had no desire to be a soldier.”<ref>Browning, 103.</ref> This became evident in the summer of 1940 when he asked to be discharged after serving as a driver in Poland less than a year after the German invasion on September 1, 1939.
By utilizing the timeframe noticeably provided by Browning, it can be extrapolated that Buchmann witnessed a great amount of violence and carnage that was incompatible with his moral composition. It is illogical to conclude that Buchmann wanted to be discharged if he was innately inclined to kill. His discharge was summarily denied, thereby placing him in a situation where he had to become either a killer or one courageous enough to adhere to his humanity as the Order Police, Einsatzgruppen, or any other killing squad was not an environment conducive to stagnation. Men such as Buchmann were the exceptions, whereas 80-90 percent of the battalion committed murder. Without employing their own forms of psychological tools, they may not have possessed the ability to kill. One method utilized as a form of rationalization was to deflect the act of execution onto a higher authority.
For most, Jozefow was the first occasion wherein these men had to kill and the procedure devolved into such a gruesome catastrophe that it forever altered the perpetrators. After such an indoctrination it is easy to understand that future endeavors of the like seemed easier to perform, both in method and conscience. After murdering for almost a full calendar day, the men retired to the barracks without speaking a word of what had just transpired and plunged quickly into the act of psychological repression. After successfully hiding the magnitude of their participation at Jozefow, subsequent killings in and around Serokomla became routine. In stark contrast to the somber mood after their first killings, the event in Serokomla was treated by most as just another day of work. Regardless of the fact that “bodies of dead Jews were simply left lying in the gravel pits,” the men seemed unfazed as they “stopped in Kock, where they had an afternoon meal.”<ref>Browning, 100.</ref>
[[File:101 poles to cattle trains circa 1941.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Members of the 101 marching Polish Jews to cattle trains for deportation, 1941.]]
Repression apparently worked towards desensitization in the immediate aftermath; however, long term psychological consequences were not to be avoided. The men suffered what we today refer to as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) which manifests in various forms including physical symptoms, nightmares, and outright psychosis. Commander of the HSSPF Central Division, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was diagnosed with an “‘incapacitating illness’” and also suffered from “‘visions in connection with the shootings of the Jews…and from other difficult experiences in the east.’”<ref>Browning, 25.</ref>
