Changes

Many southerners, whose economic well-being was based on exporting cotton, were so upset with the 1828 tariff that it became known to them as “The Tariff of Abominations” and nowhere was this attitude more prevalent than in South Carolina. The leader of the anti-tariff movement in South Carolina was a former congressman and secretary of state and future vice president and senator, John C. Calhoun. Although Calhoun supported the 1816 tariff for the purpose of national defense, he was against anymore, arguing that tariffs were anti-free trade. <ref> Freehling, William W. <i> [https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195076818/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0195076818&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=5948c6859f2ec8b4f647ea93084c0c7d Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina, 1816-1836].</i> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 95</ref> An anti-tariff philosophy began to be disseminated throughout South Carolina and in Washington by some of South Carolina’s congressional representatives. They logically argued that the tariffs could start a trade war that would hurt their export based livelihoods, but there were also political and racial components to their anti-tariff stance. Many in South Carolina’s slave-owning planter class saw tariffs as a violation of state’s rights. They supported the “slippery slope” argument by stating that if South Carolina’s economic freedoms could be usurped by tariffs, then it was only a matter of time until the federal government told them they had to free their slaves. <ref> Freehling, pgs. 115-16</ref>

====The Crisis====

[[File: JohnCalhoun.png|200px|thumbnail|left|John C. Calhoun (1782-1850)]]

In early 1833, the Nullifiers appeared unwilling to budge on their position and some of the more radical members of the movement began whispering about secession. The ever bellicose Jackson was not in the mood to deal with such talk and let some of this own threats leak to the press. As all of this was going on, Henry Clay, who was then a Senator from Kentucky, stepped forward to earn his title as the “Great Compromiser.” Working with Calhoun, he crafted a compromise tariff that used the 1832 tariff as a base point but reduced duties over a nine-year period to 20%. <ref> Ellis, p. 168</ref> The compromise satisfied most of the national Nullifiers, but something was needed to appease Webster, Jackson, and the Unionists, so a “Force Bill” was attached to the tariff that authorized the use of force to collect the duties if need be. Although the compromise tariff had the votes to go through Congress, it ultimately came down to how the state Nullifiers in South Carolina viewed it. On March 11, 1832, the Nullifiers held another convention where they voted to accept the compromise. <ref> Ellis, p. 176</ref> The crisis had been averted, but immense political damage had been done.

====The Impact of the Nullification Crisis====

[[File: Clay_portrait.jpg|300px|thumbnail|left|250px|Henry Clay (1777-1852)]]

====Conclusion====

====References====