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[[File:Lyndon_B._Johnson.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px| President Lyndon Johnson, 1964]]__NOTOC__
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War (aka "The Six Day War") marked the failure of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations’ efforts to prevent renewed Arab-Israeli conflict following the 1956 Suez War. Unwilling to return to what National Security Advisor Walter Rostow called the “tenuous chewing gum and string arrangements” established after Suez, the Johnson administration sought Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it had occupied in exchange for peace settlements with its Arab neighbors. This formula has remained the basis of all U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts into the present.
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency witnessed the transformation of the American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
====Israel routs the Arab nations and Israel expands territory====
[[File:Israeli_tanks_advancing_on_the_Golan_Heights._June_1967._D327-098.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px|Israel advancing into the Golan Heights in Syria]]
Between June 5 and June 10, Israel defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. From the beginning, the United States sought a ceasefire in order to prevent an Arab defeat bad enough to force the Soviet Union to intervene. U.S. officials were also concerned about alienating pro-Western Arab regimes, especially after Egypt and several other Arab states accused the United States of helping Israel and broke diplomatic relations. Yet after June 5, the administration did not also demand an immediate Israeli pullback from the territories it had occupied. U.S. officials believed that in light of the tenuous nature of the prewar armistice regime, they should not force Israel to withdraw unless peace settlements were put into place.
