Changes

The United States and the United Kingdom had few immediate options if hostilities broke out. Because of the drawdown in U.S. and British combat forces since the end of the Second World War, the Red Army stationed in and around Berlin dwarfed the Western Allied military presence. On June 13, 1948, the administrator of U.S.-occupied Germany, General Lucius Clay, reported to Washington that “There is no practicability in maintaining our Berlin position. It must not be evaluated on that basis... We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and Europe.

[[File:C-54landingattemplehof.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px|Douglas C-54 Skymaster lands at the Tempelhof Airport]]

Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.” The Truman administration agreed. Based upon written agreements with the Soviet Union in 1945, Berlin's only connections to the Western Allies were air corridors from West Germany used to supply Berlin by air. The administration calculated that if the Soviets opposed the airlift with force, it would be an act of aggression against an unarmed humanitarian mission and the violation of an explicit agreement. Thus, the onus of igniting a conflict between the former allies would be on the aggressor.