Changes

[[File:Kursk Soviet machineguns.jpg|thumbnail|275px|Soviet Soldiers at Kursk]]Hitler decreed that “there must be no failure” during Operation Citadel. Learning from their mistakes After from intelligence failures of Stalingrad when poor intelligence had proven to be disastrous, they the German High Command collected all the intelligence that they could get. Reconnaissance planes photographed all the defensive systems that the Soviets had established in the Kursk and Oriel bulge. Despite the vast efforts spent on this intelligence gathering information the Germans had failed to establish the size of the Russian forces in the area. Even though the Germans had acquired a great deal of information, they interpreted it incorrectly .<ref> Barbier, p. 113</ref>. This misled the Germans into overestimating their chances of success in the coming offensive. However, Russia’s military leaders had suspected that there would be an attack on the bulge between Kursk and Oriel. They believed that the Germans had to attempt desperately needed to remove the bulge at Kursk. Soviet intelligence was excellent- they had first-hand accounts of German armor send sent to the Oriel-Kharkov region.<ref> Zhukov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich & Harrison E., Salisbury, ''Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles (''New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 116</ref>. The Soviets had even captured some German officers who during interrogation divulged that the offensive would be in the Kursk area and . They even gave the date of the coming German attack. The better Soviet intelligence meant that they had a decided advantage even before the battle had started .<ref> Zhukov, p 234</ref>. [[File:Kursk Soviet machineguns.jpg|thumbnail|200px|Soviet Soldiers at Kursk]]