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One aspect of the Battle that is often overlooked by historians was the aerial battle between the Luftwaffe and the Soviet air force<ref> Bergström, Christopher. Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943. (Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen, 2002) p. 78 </ref>. By 1943 the position of the Luftwaffe had started to weaken and it was beginning to lose the its traditionalair superiority it had over the Soviet air force since Operation BarbarossaAir Force. This shift was because more and more of its Due to the dramatic diversions resources had been diverted to the western front west and . The Luftwaffe was firced to the defense of defend German cities against from the Allies intense Allied bombing campaign. The Luftwaffe could only achieve air superiority in local areas.  By 1943, less than 40% of the Luftwaffe was stationed on the Easter Front. During the Battle of Kursk, it was expected by the German High Command that the Luftwaffe would play a key role in the battle. They were persuaded of this by the Luftwaffe’s new planes, that they believed to be much superior to the Russian planes. <ref> Bergström, p. 156</ref>. However, the Luftwaffe was unable to achieve air superiority and as the battle progressed it lost the initiative to the Soviet Air force. This meant that the Germans could not use the Luftwaffe to secure its objectives at Kursk. Indeed, in the closing days of the battle, for the first time in the war on the Easter Front, the Russian air force came to control the skies and inflict terrible damage on the retreating Germans tanks and vehicles. The German military’s failure to secure air superiority over Kursk was one of the main reasons why the battle resulted in a German defeat. This was another example of the unrealistic expectations of the Germany army before the Battle of Kursk.