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==Hitler’s mistaken tactics==
[[File:Stalingrad three.jpg|thumbnail|300px|Fighting at Stalingrad]]
Hitler saw the war in terms of his personal rivalry with Stalin and he decided to attack the city, because of its symbolic value. However, the original aim of the offensive in Southern Russian was to secure the oil fields in the Caucasus. The oil was essential for the German war machine. Hitler knew this – instead of opting for concentrating all his forces on the conquest of the oil fields, he made perhaps a fateful mistake. He divided his forces. It has long been one of the fundamental beliefs in military strategy that it was reckless to divide one’s forces in enemy territory. However, this is exactly what Hitler did, contrary to all the advice of his Generals.<ref> Beevor, Antony, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0140284583/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0140284583&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=19c551047636454c9c37c00ac3d62654 Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943]'' (Viking, London, 1998), p. 117</ref> He sent some of the German army south to take the oil fields in the Caucuses and their prime objective was Baku.
Hitler then ordered the 6th Army to advance towards Stalingrad and to take the city, even though it lacked strategic value. Hitler was fixated by the idea of capturing Stalingrad and it became his personal obsession. This led him to ignore the reality on the ground and his general's advice. His foolishness lead to the destruction of the German 6th army. Not only had Hitler divided his forces, but he also allocated too little men and material to the capture of Stalingrad. It was usually accepted at the time and since that an attacking force needs to have at least a 3 to one advantage over the defenders in order to achieve their goals. The Germans did not the necessary numerical advantage over the Soviets.<ref> Beevor, p. 119</ref> This made the 6th army’s prospect of success very uncertain.
Furthermore, Hitler in his obsession to seize the city meant that he was not fully aware of the situation around the city. For example, German forces had been unable to push back Soviet forces during the series of battles known as the Kolton Operations. This left the Germans exposed on their flanks as they pressed further into the city. Because Hitler divided the German forces, the flank of the 6th army was insufficiently protected.<ref>Beevor, p. 156</ref> Poorly trained Romanian and Italian forces guarded the flanks and many German commanders privately believed that they could not protect their rear from Soviet attack. Hitler’s determination to capture Stalingrad meant that he dispatched the 6th army on a mission that was unlikely to achieve its objectives and placed it at great risk. Hitler's interference hampered the 6th Army's throughout the siege of Stalingrad. Hitler's style of leadership was the complete opposite of Stalin's. The Soviet leader, had reformed the Soviet High Command, the ''Stavka'', and granted ‘more autonomy and independence’ to capable generals such as Zhukhov.<ref> Zhukov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich & Harrison E., Salisbury, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0815410980/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0815410980&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=557435d4a5b0f047e76ecac237f82afd Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles]'' (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 116</ref> The leader of the Soviet Union had learned lessons from the early days of Operation Barbarossa. He let his generals do the fighting and draw up the strategies needed to beat the Germans. <ref>Beevor, p. 178</ref>.
==Battle for the City==
