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[[File<youtube>https: Miltiades_Munich//www.jpg|300px|thumbnail|left|Bust of the Athenian General, Miltiades]]youtube.com/watch?v=2cubGxusJhw</youtube>

The Athenians were clearly underdogs at the Battle [[File: Miltiades_Munich.jpg|200px|thumbnail|left|Bust of Marathon, but achieved a convincing tactical and moral victory for a number of reasons that were both tangible and intangible. Among the tangible reasons for the Athenian victory were the high-quality of their commandersGeneral, especially Miltiades, who knew ]]__NOTOC__Few battles in the ancient world had as much impact on history as the capabilities and limitations Battle of their force and what they could expect from the PersiansMarathon. The Athenian commanders were familiar with the terrain and used it accordingly, as opposed to the myopic Persian commanders who relied almost solely on their numbers. Also, the average Greek warriorbattle has provided a fodder for numerous books, known as <i>hoplites</i>documentaries, were better equipped than their Persians counterpartsand movies, which proved to be vital in the latter stages of often portray the event as an important battle. Along with in the tangible and strategic factors that propelled the Athenians to victory were several intangibles that factored in their favor including: their love of existential struggle between European freedom and rights as citizens that they did not want to lose; the fear Oriental despotism. The Battle of what the Persians would do to their city marathons reality is much less hyperbolic and families of they were to lose much more complex than the battle; and shame over not doing more to help their Ionian Greek cousins in their time of needpopular media often depicts, although it was just as important.

The Battle of Marathon was a turning point in the Greco-Persian Wars (499-449 BC) as it put a check on the mighty Achaemenid Persian military juggernaut that was threatening to inundate all of Greece and put the Greek people under their tyranny. The “Great King” Darius I (ruled 522-486 BC) of the Achaemenid Empire ruthlessly crushed the Ionian Revolt (499-493 BC) of the Greek-Anatolian city-states, which proved to be the first round of the Greco-Persian Wars and the event that placed the what was at the time the not so important city-state of Athens directly in the path of Persian aggression. The Athenians supported their Greek-Ionian cousins in the revolt, thereby making them the eternal enemies of Persians and causing Darius I to send a large amphibious invasion force to Athens in 490 BC. Despite being outnumbered, the Athenians pushed back the Persian tide on an inconsequential plain near a small town known as Marathon. The Athenians were clearly underdogs at the Battle of Marathon, but achieved a convincing tactical and moral victory for a number of reasons that were both tangible and intangible. Among the tangible reasons for the Athenian victory were the high-quality of their commanders, especially Miltiades, who knew the capabilities and limitations of their force and what they could expect from the Persians. The Athenian commanders were familiar with the terrain and used it accordingly, as opposed to the myopic Persian commanders who relied almost solely on their numbers. The average Greek warrior, known as <i>hoplites</i>, was better equipped than their Persians counterparts, which proved to be vital in the latter stages of the battle. Along with the tangible and strategic factors that propelled the Athenians to victory were several intangibles that factored in their favor including: their love of freedom and rights as citizens that they did not want to lose; the fear of what the Persians would do to their city and families of they were to lose the battle; and shame over not doing more to help their Ionian Greek cousins in their time of need.  ====The Ionian Revolt====

The event that placed Athens, and later Sparta and most of Greece, in the cross-hairs of the Persians was their involvement in the Ionian Revolt. The Greek city-states in the coastal region of the Turkey's modern nation-state of Turkey, which was known in ancient times as “Ionia,” were firmly under the control of the Achaemenid Persians at the beginning of the fifth century BC as a “satrapy” or province. Ionia was listed as an Achaemenid satrapy in Persian inscriptions from Persia to Egypt and was written about by the fifth century BC Greek historian Herodotus, who noted that the province was quite lucrative as it supplied a yearly tribute of 400 talents of silver. <ref> Herodotus. <i> The Histories.</i> Translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt. (London: Penguin Books, 2003), Book III, 90</ref> The mainland Greeks continued to trade with their Ionian cousins and maintained reasonable diplomatic relations with the Persians until events unfolded in Ionia in 499 BC that set them against each other permanently.

====The Persian Fleet Sails====

Empire had nearly unlimited resources available, so Darius I appointed another commander named Datis to lead another fleet to Greece. Datis’ specific orders were to “reduce Athens and Eretria to slavery”<ref> Herodotus, Book VI, 94</ref> for their role in the Ionian Revolt.  Although Eretria was a much smaller city-state, the neighbor of Athens also sent triremes to support the Ionian Greeks so they also incurred the wrath of Darius I. Instead of following the Aegean coastline as Mardonius so tragically did, Datis decided to take the fleet straight across the Aegean, hopping the many Cyclades islands in the process. Once the Persian fleet arrived in Greece, Datis led it straight to Eretria to teach them a less and send a sign to the Athenians. Herodotus wrote:

<dh-ad/> ====The Battle====

The key to any battlefield victory is usually the result of superb planning. The Greek commanders, led by Miltiades, showed their acumen by properly mobilizing their troops, choosing the place and time to engage the Persians, and by showing creativity with their strategies in the face of overwhelming numbers. To counteract the Persian numbers, the Athenians knew that they had to muster every man they could to their cause so they started by requesting help from their allies the Spartans. Although Sparta and Athens were rivals throughout most of Hellenic history, they were allied against the Persians during the Greco-Persian Wars.  Miltiades knew that the martial minded Spartans could give them the edge against the Persians so he sent a messenger to request their assistance. The Battle of Marathon took place on September 11, which coincided with an important Spartan religious festival dedicated to Apollo Karenios, so the Athenians would have to find help elsewhere. <ref> Christian, Dirk Lund, Thomas Heine Nielsen, and Adam Schwartz. “Herodotos and <i>Hemerodromoi</i>: Pheidippides’ Run from Athens to Sparta in 490 BC from Historical and Physiological Perspectives.” <i>Hermes.</i> 137 (2009) p. 161</ref>

Once the men of Athens were mobilized, it was up to Miltiades and the other generals to decide how they would engage the Persians. Some Athenians believed that it was best to wait for the Persians and to fight them in a siege, but Miltiades knew that such a venture was doomed to failure after seeing what happened to Eretria. Miltiades argued that they needed to meet the Persians as soon as they landed their ships on ground that could favor their numerical inferiority. The Athenians chose the plain near a town named Marathon to engage the Persians because that was near where the Persians would come to shore and it was sacred to the Greek demi-god Hercules. <ref>Herodotus, Book VI, 108</ref> The Athenians were able to muster about 10,000 hoplites and were augmented by 1,000 men from their Greek allies in Plataea. Once the Athenians picked the location, they did not directly engage the Persians, who were camped near the shore, but gradually advanced over the course of a few days, felling trees as they went. Once they arrived at would be the battlefield they were protected in their rear and flanks by rugged hills, which made the Persian cavalry useless and pinned them in a bottleneck. <ref> Hammond, pgs. 34-39</ref> With the odds somewhat more favorable, Miltiades was ready to lead his men into battle.

Miltiades next initiated two battlefield strategies that proved The Athenians were able to be fatal for the Persiansmuster about 10,000 hoplites and were augmented by 1,000 men from their Greek allies in Plataea. He focused his best troops on Once the wings of Athenians picked the Greek line instead of location, they did not directly engage the centerPersians, which was where who were camped near the best troops traditionally fought in battles during this era. Once his troops were lined upshore, he ordered but gradually advanced over the course of a nearly one mile charge by charge by his men to engage the Persian linefew days, felling trees as they went. Although one Once they arrived at would think that running to a battle would wind be the troops battlefield they were protected in their rear and therefore be counterproductiveflanks by rugged hills, in this case it had the result of rendering which made the Persian archery and cavalry uselessand pinned them in a bottleneck. <ref>Hammond, ppgs. 4034-39</ref> When With the two armies engagedodds somewhat more favorable, the Greek center gave way, but that Miltiades was part of Miltiades’ ultimate strategy as Herodotus noted:ready to lead his men into battle.

“The Athenians Miltiades next initiated two battlefield strategies that proved to be fatal for the Persians. He focused his best troops on one wing and the Plataeans on wings of the other were both victorious. Having got Greek line instead of the upper handcenter, they left which was where the defeated enemy best troops traditionally fought in battles during this era. Once his troops were lined up, he ordered a nearly one mile charge by his men to make their escape, and them drawing engage the two wings together into Persian line. Although one would think that running to a single unitbattle would wind the troops and therefore be counterproductive, they turned their attention to the Persians who in this case it had broken through in the centre. Here again they were triumphant, chasing result of rendering the routed enemy, Persian archery and cutting them down until they came to the seacavalry useless.” <ref> HerodotusHammond, Book VI, 113p. 40</ref> When the two armies engaged, the Greek center gave way, but that was part of Miltiades’ ultimate strategy as Herodotus noted:

“The Athenians on one wing and the Plataeans on the other were both victorious. Having got the upper hand, they left the defeated enemy to make their escape, and them drawing the two wings together into a single unit, they turned their attention to the Persians who had broken through in the centre. Here again they were triumphant, chasing the routed enemy, and cutting them down until they came to the sea.” <ref> Herodotus, Book VI, 113</ref> At that point Datis took what was left of the fleet and tried to sail to Athens by sea. Herodotus wrote that the Persians anchored outside of the Athenian harbor before sailing back across the Aegean Sea to Ionia. <ref> Herodotus, Book VI, 115</ref>

====Conclusion====

====References====<references/>[[Category:wikis]][[Category:Ancient Greek History]] Updated November 21, 2020